Skip to content

Each record below names a claim, its evidence category, expected and observed result, source origin, date, revision where established, and limitation. Filters help compare related records; all entries remain readable without JavaScript. “Not verified” is an evidence status, not a passing result.

The source baseline is the preserved GCP implementation. Recorded execution comes from the owner’s docs/my-validation/ collection, whose README records 2026-08-23. The offline predicate and identity checks were executed on 2026-10-04 for this handbook. They did not query a live registry or cluster.

Browse all fourteen evidence screenshots for website-delivered full-resolution images and their individual provenance.

12 records. All records are readable without JavaScript.

Recorded execution · accepted

The pictured main workflow completed its build, signing and verification jobs.

Recorded result: Capture shows Success for a main workflow at commit 27a94b0, with build, sign and Verify jobs green.

Captured main workflow for source revision 27a94b0; distinct from the accepted live-workload artifact.
Captured main workflow for source revision 27a94b0; distinct from the accepted live-workload artifact. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: This is a captured workflow attempt, not a newly observed Actions run.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: The main workflow builds/pushes, signs/attests and verifies its selected digest.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision 27a94b066cf28b149b682f981b4e7479fa0c4065

Selected visible labels:
ci: harden trusted supply-chain verification #11
Status: Success
Build and Push
Sign and Attest
Verify
Supply Chain Verification: PASSED
SPDX JSON, 115 packages enumerated
source commit 27a94b066cf28b149b682f981b4e7479fa0c4065
Full limitations
  • This is a captured workflow attempt, not a newly observed Actions run.
  • The displayed artifact digest begins a0073f8f and differs from the 32a90d live-admission capture.
  • README run/revision context must not be substituted for the commit visibly shown in this image.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. Unmodified original. Public canonical GitHub handle/repository, source commit and historical registry scope retained; no workstation metadata or credential visible.

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · accepted

The pictured CI verification accepted authenticated SPDX and SLSA v0.2 claims for its digest.

Recorded result: Decoded verification output shows SPDX packageCount 115 and provenance builder/entryPoint/source/sourceCommit fields.

Historical CI output for a0073f8f…; verification confirms the captured claims, not an entire supply-chain assurance level.
Historical CI output for a0073f8f…; verification confirms the captured claims, not an entire supply-chain assurance level. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: Package count is this capture's output, not a measure of SBOM completeness or package safety.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Authenticated claims identify the expected digest, signer, issuer, builder, entrypoint and source.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision 27a94b066cf28b149b682f981b4e7479fa0c4065

Selected visible output:
predicateType: https://spdx.dev/Document
packageCount: 115
subjectDigest: sha256:a0073f8f1d73f62ab0a15634a48387e78f6f837cff80f27a5c6e3b0a5c1eb16a
predicateType: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2
builder: https://github.com/actions/runner
entryPoint: .github/workflows/sign-attest.yml
source: git+https://github.com/devSatym/gcp-supply-chain-security@refs/heads/main
sourceCommit: 27a94b066cf28b149b682f981b4e7479fa0c4065
Full limitations
  • Package count is this capture's output, not a measure of SBOM completeness or package safety.
  • SLSA v0.2 is a schema label; no assurance level established.
  • This digest differs from the later live-acceptance test digest.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. Unmodified original. Public workflow identity, source commit, digest and historical registry scope retained. No credential or personal workstation path visible.

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · accepted

The pictured application was Healthy and Synced to canonical main at capture time.

Recorded result: Capture shows Healthy, Synced to main(c67aefd), Sync OK to 9bf574c, two running Pod nodes.

Argo reconciliation captured on 2026-08-23; current sync c67aefd and last-sync 9bf574c are separate observations.
Argo reconciliation captured on 2026-08-23; current sync c67aefd and last-sync 9bf574c are separate observations. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: Healthy/Synced describes captured reconciliation, not cryptographic verification by Argo.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Argo reconciles the selected Helm release and reports healthy workload resources.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision c67aefdb7e140edf94213284bc2cb73a0b1d5a46

Selected visible labels:
APP HEALTH Healthy
SYNC STATUS Synced to main(c67aefd)
Auto sync is enabled.
LAST SYNC Sync OK to 9bf574c
Succeeded 5 hours ago (Sun Aug 23 2026 14:56:28 GMT+0530)
Two Pod nodes: Running 1/1
Full limitations
  • Healthy/Synced describes captured reconciliation, not cryptographic verification by Argo.
  • Current sync revision and last-sync revision are different visible fields; neither is automatically the artifact build revision.
  • The picture does not independently establish policy revision or all admitted image fields.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. Unmodified original. Application status, public source revisions and timestamps retained; no user-info contents or credential visible.

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · accepted

The captured trusted Helm release passed API-server dry run; the application separately had two available replicas.

Recorded result: Service and Deployment configured under server dry run; live Deployment listed 2/2 ready and available.

The signed release passes server dry-run; a separate query reports two available replicas.
The signed release passes server dry-run; a separate query reports two available replicas. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: Server dry run does not itself create the observed live replicas; the capture includes separate live-read commands.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: A workload using the signed selected digest is accepted in the matched namespace.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Selected visible output:
service/supply-chain-demo configured (server dry run)
deployment.apps/supply-chain-demo configured (server dry run)
RESULT: PASS - trusted workload admitted by API server / Kyverno
NAME READY UP-TO-DATE AVAILABLE AGE
supply-chain-demo 2/2 2 2 5h14m
TRUSTED IMAGE DIGEST
sha256:32a90d832fdf76794fa5477e42e1fdcec28c9eb6e0deee48ad466d1f7d9fc563
Full limitations
  • Server dry run does not itself create the observed live replicas; the capture includes separate live-read commands.
  • The source commit that built this image and the exact installed policy revision are not established by this screenshot.
  • Acceptance is historical, not proof of today's controller or workload status.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. The original screenshot is approved for display at the owner’s explicit request for all evidence images and subsequent Cloudflare publication. Original terminal metadata remains visible. No additional pixel redaction was selected or applied. The selected transcript omits incidental prompts without changing the recorded result.

Read the approved selected-output transcript →

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · rejected

The captured API-server dry run rejected a matching unsigned image.

Recorded result: mutate.kyverno.svc-fail denied the request; signature reported no signatures found and attestations reported no matching attestations.

API-server dry-run rejects the matched unsigned test image.
API-server dry-run rejects the matched unsigned test image. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: This is one server-side dry-run request, not a persisted negative deployment.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Reject the matched image without required approved signature and attestations.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Selected visible output:
Unsigned image digest:
sha256:18549c45e5d1d87804372cb8082cefbee1019b9c592d816d14817cc12472ca17
admission webhook "mutate.kyverno.svc-fail" denied the request
resource Pod/default/unsigned-image-test was blocked
verify-image-signature: no signatures found
verify-provenance-attestation: image attestations verification failed, verifiedCount: 0, requiredCount: 1, error: no matching attestations
verify-sbom-attestation: image attestations verification failed, verifiedCount: 0, requiredCount: 1, error: no matching attestations
RESULT: PASS - unsigned image DENIED; no signatures found
Full limitations
  • This is one server-side dry-run request, not a persisted negative deployment.
  • Three missing claims occur together; it does not isolate each attestation requirement independently.
  • Unmatched registries and excluded namespaces were not tested in this capture.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. The original screenshot is approved for display at the owner’s explicit request for all evidence images and subsequent Cloudflare publication. Original terminal metadata remains visible. No additional pixel redaction was selected or applied. The selected transcript omits incidental prompts without changing the recorded result.

Read the approved selected-output transcript →

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · rejected

A known signed test digest was rejected when one temporary policy changed both signer subject and provenance source expectations.

Recorded result: The request was denied with subject mismatch and provenance attestation-check failure; temporary policy deletion is visible.

A temporary policy with changed signer/source expectations rejects a known signed digest and is then deleted.
A temporary policy with changed signer/source expectations rejects a known signed digest and is then deleted. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: One combined experiment changes two expected fields; not two isolated proofs.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Reject a known signed image when the configured trust expectations do not match its claims.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Selected visible output:
clusterpolicy.kyverno.io/test-invalid-trust-expectations created
resource Pod/default/test-invalid-trust was blocked
reject-wrong-keyless-identity: subject mismatch
expected .../.github/workflows/not-the-signing-workflow.yml@refs/heads/main
received .../.github/workflows/sign-attest.yml@refs/heads/main
reject-wrong-provenance-source: image attestations verification failed, verifiedCount: 0, requiredCount: 1; attestation checks failed
RESULT: PASS - invalid identity/provenance DENIED as expected
clusterpolicy.kyverno.io "test-invalid-trust-expectations" deleted
CLEANUP: Temporary ClusterPolicy removed
Full limitations
  • One combined experiment changes two expected fields; not two isolated proofs.
  • The signer itself is not changed and the image is not shown being tampered with.
  • The transcript uses ellipses only for repeated canonical repository prefixes and omits incidental terminal metadata.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. The original screenshot is approved for display at the owner’s explicit request for all evidence images and subsequent Cloudflare publication. Original terminal metadata remains visible. No additional pixel redaction was selected or applied. The selected transcript omits incidental prompts without changing the recorded result.

Read the approved selected-output transcript →

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · rejected

Both captured mixed-image fixtures with an unsigned initContainer were denied.

Recorded result: API-server dry runs for test-mixed-containers and test-init-unsigned were denied, each citing unsigned-test with no signatures and no matching attestations.

Both mixed-image fixtures containing an unsigned initContainer are denied.
Both mixed-image fixtures containing an unsigned initContainer are denied. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: The baseline YAML shows both fixtures use an unsigned initContainer alongside a signed regular container.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: An approved regular image must not excuse an unsigned matched init image in the same Pod.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Selected visible output:
TEST 1 - Mixed trusted + untrusted containers
resource Pod/default/test-mixed-containers was blocked
verify-image-signature: supply-chain-demo:unsigned-test: no signatures found
verify-provenance-attestation: no matching attestations
verify-sbom-attestation: no matching attestations
RESULT 1: PASS - mixed-container bypass DENIED
TEST 2 - Unsigned initContainer
resource Pod/default/test-init-unsigned was blocked
verify-image-signature: supply-chain-demo:unsigned-test: no signatures found
RESULT 2: PASS - unsigned initContainer DENIED
Full limitations
  • The baseline YAML shows both fixtures use an unsigned initContainer alongside a signed regular container.
  • This does not establish unsigned regular sidecar or ephemeral-container subresource coverage.
  • The capture's final broad phrase about protected bypass paths is narrowed to the fields actually tested.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. The original screenshot is approved for display at the owner’s explicit request for all evidence images and subsequent Cloudflare publication. Original terminal metadata remains visible. No additional pixel redaction was selected or applied. The selected transcript omits incidental prompts without changing the recorded result.

Read the approved selected-output transcript →

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Recorded execution · detected

The shell executed as UID/GID 10001 and a Critical Falco event was then recorded.

Recorded result: The command returned id output and Falco logs showed the named Critical shell rule.

The controlled shell returns UID/GID 10001; Falco subsequently records a Critical shell event.
The controlled shell returns UID/GID 10001; Falco subsequently records a Critical shell event. Select the image for full resolution.

Key limitation: Detection happened after successful shell execution; no prevention or automatic termination observed.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Record unexpected shell execution in the application namespace with the configured Falco rule.

Historical GCP, europe-west1; current environment not checked · observed 2026-08-23 · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Selected visible output:
uid=10001(appuser) gid=10001(appgroup) groups=10001(appgroup)
"priority": "Critical"
"rule": "Shell Spawned In Signed Workload Pod"
Critical Unexpected shell spawned in hardened pod
user=appuser
ns=default
cmdline=sh -c id
RESULT: PASS - Falco detected the controlled runtime shell
Full limitations
  • Detection happened after successful shell execution; no prevention or automatic termination observed.
  • The rule condition does not verify signatures.
  • The captured image tag does not establish a manifest digest or build commit.
  • No external notification or incident-response completion captured.

Visual review of original capture. Collection capture date attributed to docs/my-validation/README.md; this task did not rerun its cloud experiment. The original screenshot is approved for display at the owner’s explicit request for all evidence images and subsequent Cloudflare publication. Original terminal metadata remains visible. No additional pixel redaction was selected or applied. The selected transcript omits incidental prompts without changing the recorded result.

Read the approved selected-output transcript →

Inspect the related gallery capture →

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Inspected source · configured

The committed policy requires three claims only for matching application images outside explicit exclusions.

Recorded result: Three Enforce rules, exact signer/issuer, required digest verification, five namespace exclusions, one imageReferences path and three provenance conditions are present.

Key limitation: Configuration is not a fresh server-side enforcement result.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: The policy expresses signature, SPDX and SLSA verification requirements.

Offline detached baseline inspection; no cloud mutation · observed 2026-10-04 · source revision cbbc807c0c150e106affa89fbb1b9e8349005749

Source inspection:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
background: true
required: true
verifyDigest: true
mutateDigest: false
Provenance conditions: entryPoint, builder.id, configSource.uri
Full limitations
  • Configuration is not a fresh server-side enforcement result.
  • No exact source-commit or material condition at admission.
  • No committed installed-version/webhook outage state established.

Source inspected against the pinned baseline; execution scope stated explicitly. No screenshot or sensitive runtime state published.

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Local test · accepted

Offline evaluation of the actual Rule 3 conditions matched the supplied provenance predicate fixture.

Recorded result: Three conditions passed; the identity-consistency shell check also passed from the baseline working directory.

Key limitation: The Python test does not authenticate a signature or query registry/admission.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: All shipped Rule 3 JMESPath expressions resolve expected values in the captured predicate shape.

Offline detached baseline inspection; no cloud mutation · observed 2026-10-04 · source revision cbbc807c0c150e106affa89fbb1b9e8349005749

Executed 2026-10-04:
OK: invocation.configSource.entryPoint -> .github/workflows/sign-attest.yml
OK: builder.id -> https://github.com/actions/runner
OK: invocation.configSource.uri -> git+https://github.com/devSatym/gcp-supply-chain-security@refs/heads/main
All Rule 3 conditions match the real provenance predicate shape.
All certificate identity references are consistent.
Full limitations
  • The Python test does not authenticate a signature or query registry/admission.
  • The shell check includes preserved historical Gatekeeper files and checks string consistency, not active deployment.
  • One predicate fixture is not exhaustive malformed-claim or negative-case coverage.

Source inspected against the pinned baseline; execution scope stated explicitly. No screenshot or sensitive runtime state published.

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Not verified · gap

Discord delivery and incident response were not demonstrated in the recorded validation.

Recorded result: The validation README says the alerting path was disabled pending a real webhook; no Discord capture.

Key limitation: Optional Terraform resources do not establish enabled deployment.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Only an enabled, configured and executed alert test could establish external delivery.

Historical optional GCP alerting path; disabled per validation README · observed date unknown · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

Recorded statement: No Discord alert was captured because the alerting path is disabled until a real webhook is supplied.
Full limitations
  • Optional Terraform resources do not establish enabled deployment.
  • A runtime log alone does not prove event delivery or response.

Source inspected against the pinned baseline; execution scope stated explicitly. No screenshot or sensitive runtime state published.

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →
Not verified · gap

Ephemeral-container updates, unmatched-image handling and verifier outages have no established live result in this catalogue.

Recorded result: No recorded test found for ephemeral-container subresource, isolated unsigned regular sidecar, registry outage or controller outage.

Key limitation: Absence from reviewed evidence is not proof of a vulnerability or capability.

Transcript and provenance

Expected in this setup: Fresh isolated tests and installed configuration inspection are required to establish each behavior.

Offline detached baseline inspection; no cloud mutation · observed date unknown · source revision unknown; not inferred from the documentation baseline

No execution transcript exists for these cases.
Full limitations
  • Absence from reviewed evidence is not proof of a vulnerability or capability.
  • Enforce and webhook name do not establish the complete version-specific outage contract.

Source inspected against the pinned baseline; execution scope stated explicitly. No screenshot or sensitive runtime state published.

Inspect the untouched, commit-pinned original →

The complete fourteen-image gallery provides website-hosted screenshots and accessible full-resolution links. All fourteen original captures retain their bytes and dimensions. Public source identities and historical registry scope remain relevant attribution and verification context.

The terminal captures include personal workstation metadata. The owner requested all original images and subsequently authorized publishing them with the handbook on Cloudflare. Their original bytes and technical body remain intact, with the visible metadata disclosed in their provenance notes. No additional redaction was selected; any future derivative needs a separate instruction and explicit display provenance. Selected output transcripts remain readable alongside the images. These excerpts are not full logs; omitted prompts and machine identifiers do not change the recorded decision.

The older upstream docs/evidence/ files remain separate historical source material. This catalogue does not relabel those captures as the owner’s deployment proof. Website browser screenshots are also separate: they test website appearance and behavior rather than cloud security.

Read records together without merging them

Section titled “Read records together without merging them”

The approved CI and attestation images show 27a94b0 and an a0073f8f… artifact digest. The trusted live-test capture shows 32a90d…. The Argo screenshot shows current sync c67aefd and last successful sync 9bf574c. The runtime screenshot’s tag metadata is not a manifest digest. Each observation retains its own revision association rather than borrowing a convenient value from another file.

A denial of an unsigned image supports a scoped missing-claim decision. It does not isolate every attestation requirement. The combined wrong-trust test changes two expectations at once. The mixed/init tests both exercise initContainers. A detected shell is an executed shell, and optional notification delivery is unverified.

For the reasoning behind these interpretations, start with how to read evidence and known gaps. A future update should add a distinct evidence record only after inspecting the actual result and its provenance.